Moral Uncertainty, Metaethics, and Natural Law


After introducing the problems of moral uncertainty and intertheoretic comparability, I will show that moral realism and moral constructivism involve opposite explanatory relationships between theories and particular judgements. Based on these explanatory relationships, I will make an analogy between moral constructivism and Humeanism about natural laws one hand, and moral realism and anti-Humeanism about natural laws on the other. This analogy will allow me to show why intertheoretic comparisons of choice-worthiness are in principle possible according to moral constructivism, but not according to moral realism.

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Corin Katzke
Yale University


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