Fittingness and Idealization

Ethics 124 (3):572-588 (2014)
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This note explores how ideal subjectivism in metanormative theory can help solve two important problems for Fitting Attitude analyses of value. The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is that there may be sufficient reason for attitude Y even if the object is not Y-able. The many-kinds-of-fittingness problem is that the same attitude can be fitting in many ways. Ideal subjectivism addresses both by maintaining that an attitude is W-ly fitting if and only if endorsed by any W-ly ideal subject. A subject is W-ly ideal when the most robust way of avoiding W-type practical problems is deferring to her endorsement
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Favoring.Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1953-1971.
Sentimentalism, Blameworthiness, and Wrongdoing.Antti Kauppinen - 2017 - In Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism. Cambridge University Press.
Ideals and Idols: On the Nature and Appropriateness of Agential Admiration.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Alfred Archer & Andre Grahlé (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Admiration. Rowman and Littlefield.
Practical Reasoning.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
Not Quite Neo-Sentimentalism.Oliver-Skuse, Tristram

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