Sentimentalism, Blameworthiness, and Wrongdoing

In Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism. Cambridge University Press (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
For ambitious metaphysical neo-sentimentalists, all normative facts are grounded in fitting attitudes, where fittingness is understood in naturalistic terms. In this paper, I offer a neo-sentimentalist account of blameworthiness in terms of the reactive attitudes of a morally authoritative subject I label a Nagelian Imp. I also argue that moral impermissibility is indirectly linked to blameworthiness: roughly, an act is morally impermissible if and only if and because it is not *possible* in the circumstances to adopt a plan of performing it without meriting blame, assuming the agent is rational, informed, and meets the conditions of accountability.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KAUSBA-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-01-11
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-01-11

Total views
305 ( #13,240 of 46,447 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
81 ( #8,273 of 46,447 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.