Sentimentalism, Blameworthiness, and Wrongdoing

In Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism. Cambridge University Press (2017)
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Abstract
For ambitious metaphysical neo-sentimentalists, all normative facts are grounded in fitting attitudes, where fittingness is understood in naturalistic terms. In this paper, I offer a neo-sentimentalist account of blameworthiness in terms of the reactive attitudes of a morally authoritative subject I label a Nagelian Imp. I also argue that moral impermissibility is indirectly linked to blameworthiness: roughly, an act is morally impermissible if and only if and because it is not *possible* in the circumstances to adopt a plan of performing it without meriting blame, assuming the agent is rational, informed, and meets the conditions of accountability.
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Archival date: 2016-01-11
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