Self-regarding supererogatory actions

Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (3):487–498 (2003)
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Many philosophers, in discussing supererogation, maintain that supererogatory actions must be done for the benefit of others. In this paper I argue that there can be instances of self-regarding supererogatory actions. That is, there are cases in which the primary (or sole) intended beneficiary of a supererogatory action is the agent herself, and she need not be acting out of a concern for morality or moral rules. In such cases the agent still acts suitably 'beyond the call of duty', and in a morally praiseworthy fashion.

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Jason Kawall
Colgate University


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