Epistemic control without voluntarism

Philosophical Issues 33 (1):95-109 (2023)
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Abstract

It is tempting to think (though many deny) that epistemic agents exercise a distinctive kind of control over their belief‐like attitudes. My aim here is to sketch a “bottom‐up” model of epistemic agency, one that draws on an analogous model of practical agency, according to which an agent's conditional beliefs are reasons‐responsive planning states that initiate and sustain mental behavior so as to render controlled.

Author's Profile

Tim Kearl
University of Glasgow

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