Why Realists Need Tropes

Metaphysica 17 (1):69-85 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
We argue that if one wishes to be a realist, one should adopt a Neo-Aristotelian ontology involving tropes instead of a Russellian ontology of property universals and objects. Either Russellian realists should adopt the relata-specific relational tropes of instantiation instead of facts, or convert to Neo-Aristotelian realism with monadic tropes. Regarding Neo-Aristotelian realism, we have two novel points why it fares better than Russellian realism. Instantiation of property universals by tropes and characterization or inherence between tropes and objects are more transparent ontological notions than relational inherence, which is assumed in Russellian realism with the relational tropes of instantiation. Neo-Aristotelian realism makes better sense about abstract universals, which are a more viable option than concrete universals.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KEIWRN-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-10
View other versions
Added to PP index
2015-11-09

Total views
880 ( #7,146 of 71,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #26,254 of 71,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.