Abstract

In A Telic Theory of Trust, Adam Carter outlines a novel theory of trust as performance and provides a telic evaluative framework for good and bad trusting and distrusting. Roughly, to say that trust is a performance is to say that it is an attempt by a trustor that, by means of reliance on a trustee, aims at the trustee taking care of things as entrusted (29). This theory contrasts with standard theories of trust, which define trusting in terms of attitudes—such as belief (Hardin 2002; Hieronymi 2008; McMyler 2011), hope (McGeer 2008), or optimism (Jones 1996)—about the trustworthiness of trustees. It is worth highlighting that one can separate Carter’s trust theory from his telic-evaluative framework, as the framework can be applied to, at least, a belief account of trust, (insofar as one accepts a performative theory of belief). In this review of Carter's book, I argue that while Carter's book offers a novel and interesting way of evaluating good and bad trust, his criticism of standard theories (especially belief accounts), are unconvincing, and his characterisation of trust is too broad, capturing cases that do not seem to be instances of trust at all.