On Perfect Goodness

Sophia 49 (1):29-36 (2010)
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God is typically conceived as perfectly good and necessarily so, in two senses: in terms of always performing the best possible act and in terms of having maximal moral worth. Yet any being that freely performs the best act she can must be accorded greater moral worth for any such action than a being that does so necessarily. I conclude that any being that performs the best possible act of necessity cannot also have maximal moral worth, making the concept of God’s perfect goodness incoherent.
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The Nature of Necessity.Plantinga, Alvin
The Nature of Necessity.Fine, Kit & Plantinga, Alvin
Can God Be Free?Rowe, William L.
Can God Be Free?Rowe, William L.

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