The Welfare-Nihilist Arguments against Judgment Subjectivism

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (3):291-310 (2021)
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Abstract

Judgment subjectivism is the view that x is good for S if and only if, because, and to the extent that S believes, under the proper conditions, that x is good for S. In this paper, I offer three related arguments against the theory. The arguments are about what judgment subjectivism implies about the well-being of welfare nihilists, people who believe there are no welfare properties, or at least that none are instantiated. I maintain that welfare nihilists can be benefited and harmed. Judgment subjectivism is implausible because it implies otherwise.

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Anthony Kelley
Louisiana State University

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