Homologizing as kinding

In C. Kendig (ed.), Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. Routledge (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Homology is a natural kind concept, but one that has been notoriously elusive to pin down. There has been sustained debate over the nature of correspondence and the units of comparison. But this continued debate over its meaning has focused on defining homology rather than on its use in practice. The aim of this chapter is to concentrate on the practices of homologizing. I define “homologizing” to be a concept-in-use. Practices of homologizing are kinds of rule following, the satisfaction of which demarcates a category—that of being a homologue. Identifying, explaining, discovering, and understanding are exchanges that connect practice to concept through the performance of a rule by practitioners. These practices are constitutive of natural kinding activities. If homologizing is a kind of kinding, consideration of these practices of discovery, tracking, and identification not only clarifies the meaning, use, and progression of the concept of homology, but provides further understanding of the processes and progression of natural kinds and kinding practices in general.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-09-11
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
76 ( #49,221 of 2,448,874 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #55,518 of 2,448,874 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.