A plea for pragmatics

Synthese 170 (1):155 - 167 (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Let intentionalism be the view that what proposition is expressed in context by a sentence containing indexicals depends on the speaker’s intentions. It has recently been argued that intentionalism makes communicative success mysterious and that there are counterexamples to the intentionalist view in the form of cases of mismatch between the intended interpretation and the intuitively correct interpretation. In this paper, I argue that these objections can be met, once we acknowledge that we may distinguish what determines the correct interpretation from the evidence that is available to the audience, as well as from the standards by which we judge whether or not a given interpretation is reasonable. With these distinctions in place, we see that intentionalism does not render communicative success mysterious, and that cases of mismatch between the intended interpretation and the intuitively correct one can easily be accommodated. The distinction is also useful in treating the Humpty Dumpty problem for intentionalism, since it turns out that this can be treated as an extreme special case of mismatch.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KERAPF
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-08-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
219 ( #21,919 of 53,633 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #38,120 of 53,633 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.