Zagzebski on Authority and Preemption in the Domain of Belief

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The paper discusses Linda Zagzebski's account of epistemic authority. Building on Joseph Raz's account of political authority, Zagzebski argues that the basic contours of epistemic authority match those Raz ascribes to political authority. This, it is argued, is a mistake. Zagzebski is correct in identifying the pre-emptive nature of reasons provided by an authority as central to our understanding of epistemic authority. However, Zagzebski ignores important differences between practical and epistemic authority. As a result, her attempt to explain the rationality of belief on authority by applying an analogue of Raz's Normal Justification Thesis to the domain of belief fails. A successful explanation of the rationality of belief on authority will need to be attuned to the differences between political and epistemic authorities.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-10-01
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
327 ( #14,562 of 52,804 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #28,077 of 52,804 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.