Counterfactuals and Explanatory Pluralism
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
Abstract
Recent literature on noncausal explanation raises the question as to whether explanatory monism, the thesis that all explanations submit to the same analysis, is true. The leading monist proposal holds that all explanations support change-relating counterfactuals. We provide several objections to this monist position.
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Archival date: 2018-05-11
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References found in this work BETA
Depth. An Account of Scientific Explanation.Strevens, Michael
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.Woodward, James
Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement.Cartwright, Nancy
Making Things Happen. A Theory of Causal Explanation.Strevens, Michael
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Is Verstehen Scientific Understanding?Khalifa, Kareem
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2018-05-11
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362 ( #12,175 of 50,229 )
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72 ( #7,387 of 50,229 )
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