Counterfactuals and Explanatory Pluralism
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
Abstract
Recent literature on noncausal explanation raises the question as to whether explanatory monism, the thesis that all explanations submit to the same analysis, is true. The leading monist proposal holds that all explanations support change-relating counterfactuals. We provide several objections to this monist position.
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Archival date: 2018-05-11
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2018-05-11
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61 ( #5,202 of 32,567 )
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