Counterfactuals and Explanatory Pluralism

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1439-1460 (2018)
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Abstract

Recent literature on non-causal explanation raises the question as to whether explanatory monism, the thesis that all explanations submit to the same analysis, is true. The leading monist proposal holds that all explanations support change-relating counterfactuals. We provide several objections to this monist position. 1Introduction2Change-Relating Monism's Three Problems3Dependency and Monism: Unhappy Together4Another Challenge: Counterfactual Incidentalism4.1High-grade necessity4.2Unity in diversity5Conclusion

Author Profiles

Kareem Khalifa
University of California, Los Angeles
Jared A. Millson
Rhodes College

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