An Epistemicist Solution to the Alethic Paradoxes

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Abstract
This paper targets a series of potential issues for the discussion of, and modal resolution to, the alethic paradoxes advanced by Scharp (2013). I aim, then, to provide a novel, epistemicist treatment of the alethic paradoxes. In response to Curry's paradox, the epistemicist solution that I advance enables the retention of both classical logic and the traditional rules for the alethic predicate: truth-elimination and truth-introduction. By availing of epistemic modal logic, the epistemicist approach permits, further, of a descriptively adequate explanation of the indeterminacy that is exhibited by epistemic states concerning liar-paradoxical sentences.
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First archival date: 2017-06-14
Latest version: 4 (2021-01-21)
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