Grounding, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem

Synthese 195 (2):919-926 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper challenges the soundness of the two-dimensional conceivability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical truths in light of a hyperintensional, ground-theoretic regimentation of the ontology of consciousness. The regimentation demonstrates how ontological dependencies between truths about consciousness and about physics cannot be witnessed by epistemic constraints, when the latter are recorded by the conceivability—i.e., the epistemic possibility—thereof. Generalizations and other aspects of the philosophical significance of the hyperintensional regimentation are further examined.
Reprint years
2016, 2018
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2016-11-08
Latest version: 5 (2021-05-17)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
443 ( #18,096 of 72,527 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #23,862 of 72,527 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.