Hyperintensional Conceivability, Grounding, and Consciousness


This paper provides a rebuttal to the argument in Khudairi (2018) in `Synthese'. Khudairi provides a novel hyperintensional, ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness. He then argues that Chalmers' (2010) intensional two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism is unsound, in light of the hyperintensional metaphysics of consciousness. Thus, intensional conceivability cannot be a guide to hyperintensional metaphysics. This paper demonstrates that a multi-hyperintensional version of epistemic two-dimensional semantics can be countenanced, and is sufficient for conceivability to be a guide to metaphysics in the hyperintensional setting such that Chalmers' argument, hyperintensionally construed, is in fact sound.

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