A dilemma for Parfit's conception of normativity

Analysis 72 (3):466-474 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In his discussion of normative concepts in the first part of On What Matters (2011), Parfit holds that apart from the ‘ought’ of decisive reason, there are other senses of ‘ought’ which do not imply any reasons. This claim poses a dilemma for his ‘reason-involving conception’ of normativity: either Parfit has to conclude that non-reason-implying ‘oughts’ are not normative. Or else he is forced to accept that normativity needs only to involve ‘apparent reasons’ – a certain kind of hypothetical truths about reasons. I argue that both of these options are inacceptable. In the course of the discussion, I present a general objection to ‘apparent reason accounts’ of the normativity of rationality as advocated not only by Parfit, but also by Schroeder (2009) and Way (2009)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KIEADF
Upload history
Archival date: 2012-05-17
View other versions
Added to PP index
2012-05-17

Total views
1,170 ( #2,486 of 51,719 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
74 ( #6,757 of 51,719 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.