How reasons are sensitive to available evidence

In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper, I develop a theory of how claims about an agent’s normative reasons are sensitive to the epistemic circumstances of this agent, which preserves the plausible ideas that reasons are facts and that reasons can be discovered in deliberation and disclosed in advice. I argue that a plausible theory of this kind must take into account the difference between synchronic and diachronic reasons, i.e. reasons for acting immediately and reasons for acting at some later point in time. I provide a general account of the relation between synchronic and diachronic reasons, demonstrate its implications for the evidence-sensitivity of reasons and finally present and defend an argument for my view.
Reprint years
2018
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KIEHRA
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-02-01
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-02-01

Total views
674 ( #8,298 of 2,449,002 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
59 ( #10,610 of 2,449,002 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.