You ought to φ only if you may believe that you ought to φ

Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82 (2016)
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Abstract
In this paper I present an argument for the claim that you ought to do something only if you may believe that you ought to do it. More exactly, I defend the following principle about normative reasons: An agent A has decisive reason to φ only if she also has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to φ. I argue that this principle follows from the plausible assumption that it must be possible for an agent to respond correctly to her reasons. In conclusion, I discuss some implications of this argument (given that some other standard assumptions about reasons hold). One such implication is that we are always in a position to be justified in believing all truths about what we have decisive reason (or ought) to do.
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2016
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KIEYOT
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Archival date: 2016-01-22
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References found in this work BETA
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
The Domain of Reasons.Skorupski, John

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Citations of this work BETA
The Normativity of Rationality.Kiesewetter, Benjamin
The Right and the Wrong Kind of Reasons.Gertken, Jan & Kiesewetter, Benjamin

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2016-01-22

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