The Woody Allen Puzzle: How 'Authentic Alienation' Complicates Autonomy

Noûs 48 (2):729-747 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Theories of autonomy commonly make reference to some form of endorsement: an action is autonomous insofar as the agent has a second-order desire towards the motivating desire, or takes it to be a reason for action, or is not alienated from it. In this paper I argue that all such theories have difficulty accounting for certain kinds of agents, what I call ‘Woody Allen cases’. In order to make sense of such cases, I suggest, it is necessary to disambiguate two distinct forms of endorsement, both of which contribute to autonomy
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KILTWA
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-03-06
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-03-06

Total views
404 ( #10,756 of 50,346 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #17,521 of 50,346 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.