Hardcore Actualism and Possible Non‐Existence

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):122-131 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to hardcore actualism (HA), all modal truths are grounded in the concrete constituents of the actual world. In this paper, I discuss some problems faced by HA when it comes to accounting for certain alleged possibilities of non‐existence. I focus particular attention on Leech (2017)'s dilemma for HA, according to which HA must either sacrifice extensional correctness or admit mere possibilia. I propose a solution to Leech's dilemma, which relies on a distinction between weak and strong possibility. It remains the case, however, that HA cannot capture certain iterated de re possibilities of non‐existence and that it is committed to a stock of necessary existents. But I still think that the virtues of the view outweigh these costs.

Author's Profile

Samuel Kimpton-Nye
King's College London

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-04-27

Downloads
328 (#48,387)

6 months
112 (#31,071)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?