In defense of subject-sensitive invariantism

Episteme 13 (2):233-251 (2016)
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Keith DeRose has argued that the two main problems facing subject-sensitive invariantism come from the appropriateness of certain third-person denials of knowledge and the inappropriateness of now you know it, now you don't claims. I argue that proponents of SSI can adequately address both problems. First, I argue that the debate between contextualism and SSI has failed to account for an important pragmatic feature of third-person denials of knowledge. Appealing to these pragmatic features, I show that straightforward third-person denials are inappropriate in the relevant cases. And while there are certain denials that are appropriate, they pose no problems for SSI. Next, I offer an explanation, compatible with SSI, of the oddity of now you know it, now you don't claims. To conclude, I discuss the intuitiveness of purism, whose rejection is the source of many problems for SSI. I propose to explain away the intuitiveness of purism as a side-effect of the narrow focus of previous epistemological inquiries.
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Knowledge and Lotteries.Feldman, Richard
On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions.Alchourrón, Carlos E.; Gärdenfors, Peter & Makinson, David
Knowing the Answer.Schaffer, Jonathan

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Interest-Relative Invariantism.Weatherson, Brian James

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