The Content-Dependence of Imaginative Resistance

In Florian Cova & Sébastien Réhault (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 143-166 (2018)
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An observation of Hume’s has received a lot of attention over the last decade and a half: Although we can standardly imagine the most implausible scenarios, we encounter resistance when imagining propositions at odds with established moral (or perhaps more generally evaluative) convictions. The literature is ripe with ‘solutions’ to this so-called ‘Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance’. Few, however, question the plausibility of the empirical assumption at the heart of the puzzle. In this paper, we explore empirically whether the difficulty we witness in imagining certain propositions is indeed due to claim type (evaluative v. non-evaluative) or whether it is much rather driven by mundane features of content. Our findings suggest that claim type plays but a marginal role, and that there might hence not be much of a ‘puzzle’ to be solved.
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References found in this work BETA
Hume.Fabian Dorsch - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge. pp. 40-54.
Mimesis as Make-Believe.Walton, Kendall L.
The Problem of Imaginative Resistance.Gendler, Tamar Szabó & Liao, Shen-yi

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Citations of this work BETA
Imagination.Liao, Shen-yi & Gendler, Tamar
Imagination.Gendler, Tamar Szabó
Imaginative Resistance.Tuna, Emine Hande

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