Testimony as a Natural Kind

Episteme 5 (2):180-202 (2008)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I argue, first, that testimony is likely a natural kind (where natural kinds are accurately described by the homoeostatic property cluster theory) and that if it is indeed a natural kind, it is likely necessarily reliable. I argue, second, that the view of testimony as a natural kind and as necessarily reliable grounds a novel, naturalist global reductionism about testimonial justification and that this new reductionism is immune to a powerful objection to orthodox Humean global reductionism, the objection from the too-narrow induction base.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-05-21
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
239 ( #22,389 of 56,958 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #39,673 of 56,958 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.