Modality and Function: Reply to Nanay

Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (2):89-90 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper replies to Nanay’s response to my recent paper. My suggestions are the following. First, “should” or “ought” does not need to be deontic. Second, etiological theories of function, like provability logic, do not need to attribute modal force to their explanans. Third, the explanans of the homological account of trait type individuation does not appeal to a trait’s etiological function, that is, what a trait should or ought to do. Finally, my reference to Cummins’s notion of function was intended to note that the homological account is permitted to use this non-etiological notion of function.

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