On Gilbert Harman's The Intrisic Quality of Experience
Abstract
I propose that there are two kind's of qualia realism, and that Harman's observations about the transparency of experience pose a threat to only one of these.
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Archival date: 2015-06-12
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2015-06-12
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2015-06-12
Total views
1,784 ( #1,654 of 57,027 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
174 ( #2,732 of 57,027 )
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