On Gilbert Harman's The Intrisic Quality of Experience

Tim Klaassen

On Gilbert Harman's The Intrisic Quality of Experience

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Abstract

I propose that there are two kind's of qualia realism, and that Harman's observations about the transparency of experience pose a threat to only one of these.

Keywords

Transparency Diaphanousness Qualia Act-object Gilbert Harman

Categories

Aspects of Consciousness, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

Consciousness and Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind

Representationalism in Philosophy of Mind

The Objects of Perception in Philosophy of Mind

The Perceptual Relation, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

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PhilPapers/Archive ID

KLAOGH

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Archival date: 2015-06-12
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