Moral consciousness and the 'fact of reason'

In Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann (eds.), Kant's 'Critique of Practical Reason': A Critical Guide. New York: Cambridge University Press (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

At the heart of the argument of the Critique of Practical Reason, one finds Kant’s puzzling and much-criticized claim that the consciousness of the moral law can be called a ‘fact of reason’. In this essay, I clarify the meaning and the importance of this claim. I correct misunderstandings of the term ‘Factum’, situate the relevant passages within their argumentative context, and argue that Kant’s argument can be given a consistent reading on the basis of which the main questions and criticisms can be answered.

Author's Profile

Pauline Kleingeld
University of Groningen

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-07-14

Downloads
747 (#22,337)

6 months
181 (#19,380)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?