Moral consciousness and the 'fact of reason'
In Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann (eds.), Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press (2010)
Abstract
At the heart of the argument of the Critique of Practical Reason, one finds Kant’s puzzling and much-criticized claim that the consciousness of the moral law can be called a ‘fact of reason’. In this essay, I clarify the meaning and the importance of this claim. I correct misunderstandings of the term ‘Factum’, situate the relevant passages within their argumentative context, and argue that Kant’s argument can be given a consistent reading on the basis of which the main questions and criticisms can be answered.
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Archival date: 2019-02-08
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The Moral Standpoint: First or Second Personal?Herlinde Pauer-Studer - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):296-310.
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2010-07-14
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2010-07-14
Total downloads
102 ( #20,864 of 37,118 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #27,440 of 37,118 )
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