The Curious Case of the Self-Refuting Straw Man: Trafimow and Earp’s Response to Klein (2014)

Theory and Psychology 26:549– 556 (2016)
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Abstract

In their critique of Klein (2014a), Trafimow and Earp present two theses. First, they argue that, contra Klein, a well-specified theory is not a necessary condition for successful replication. Second, they contend that even when there is a well-specified theory, replication depends more on auxiliary assumptions than on theory proper. I take issue with both claims, arguing that (a) their first thesis confuses a material conditional (what I said) with a modal claim (T&E’s misreading of what I said), and (b) their second thesis has the unfortunate consequence of refuting their first thesis.

Author's Profile

Stanley Bernard Klein
University of California, Santa Barbara

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