It seems natural to think that Carnapian explication and experimental
philosophy can go hand in hand. But what exactly explicators can gain from
the data provided by experimental philosophers remains controversial.
According to an influential proposal by Shepherd and Justus, explicators
should use experimental data in the process of ‘explication preparation’.
Against this proposal, Mark Pinder has recently suggested that experimental
data can directly assist an explicator’s search for fruitful replacements of the
explicandum. In developing his argument, he also proposes a novel aspect of
what makes a concept fruitful, namely, that it is taken up by the relevant
community. In this paper, I defend explication preparation against Pinder’s
objections and argue that his uptake proposal conflates theoretical and
practical success conditions of explications. Furthermore, I argue that Pinder’s
suggested experimental procedure needs substantial revision. I end by
distinguishing two kinds of explication projects, and showing how
experimental philosophy can contribute to each of them.