Digital Me Ontology and Ethics

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Abstract
Digital me ontology and ethics. 21 December 2020. Ljupco Kocarev and Jasna Koteska. This paper addresses ontology and ethics of an AI agent called digital me. We define digital me as autonomous, decision-making, and learning agent, representing an individual and having practically immortal own life. It is assumed that digital me is equipped with the big-five personality model, ensuring that it provides a model of some aspects of a strong AI: consciousness, free will, and intentionality. As computer-based personality judgments are more accurate than those made by humans, digital me can judge the personality of the individual represented by the digital me, other individuals’ personalities, and other digital me-s. We describe seven ontological qualities of digital me: a) double-layer status of Digital Being versus digital me, b) digital me versus real me, c) mind-digital me and body-digital me, d) digital me versus doppelganger (shadow digital me), e) non-human time concept, f) social quality, g) practical immortality. We argue that with the advancement of AI’s sciences and technologies, there exist two digital me thresholds. The first threshold defines digital me having some (rudimentarily) form of consciousness, free will, and intentionality. The second threshold assumes that digital me is equipped with moral learning capabilities, implying that, in principle, digital me could develop their own ethics which significantly differs from human’s understanding of ethics. Finally we discuss the implications of digital me metaethics, normative and applied ethics, the implementation of the Golden Rule in digital me-s, and we suggest two sets of normative principles for digital me: consequentialist and duty based digital me principles. Authors are ordered alphabetically and equally contributed to the paper.
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Archival date: 2020-12-27
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2020-12-27

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