Intuition, Belief and Rational Criticisability

Abstract

A simple reductive view of intuition holds that intuition is a type of belief. That an agent who intuits that p sometimes believes that p is false is often thought to demonstrate that the simple reductive view is false. I show that this argument is inconclusive, but also that an argument for the same conclusion can be rebuilt using the notion of rational criticisability. I then use that notion to argue that perception is also not reducible to belief, and that neither intuition nor perception is reducible to credence.

Author's Profile

Ole Koksvik
Australian National University (PhD)

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-02-03

Downloads
648 (#21,758)

6 months
68 (#56,078)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?