Eliminativism and the challenge from folk belief

Noûs 43 (2):242-264 (2009)
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Virtually everyone agrees that, even after having presented the arguments for their positions, proponents of revisionary philosophical theories are required to provide some sort of account of the conflict between their theories and what the folk believe. I examine various strategies for answering the challenge from folk belief. The examination proceeds as a case study, whose focus is eliminativism about ordinary material objects. I critically assess eliminativist attempts to explain folk belief by appeal to paraphrase, experience, and intuition
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Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.

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Against Parthood.Sider, Theodore
Folk Mereology is Teleological.Rose, David & Schaffer, Jonathan

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