Fundamental Quantification and the Language of the Ontology Room

Noûs 49 (2):298-321 (2015)
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Abstract
Nihilism is the thesis that no composite objects exist. Some ontologists have advocated abandoning nihilism in favor of deep nihilism, the thesis that composites do not existO, where to existO is to be in the domain of the most fundamental quantifier. By shifting from an existential to an existentialO thesis, the deep nihilist seems to secure all the benefits of a composite-free ontology without running afoul of ordinary belief in the existence of composites. I argue that, while there are well-known reasons for accepting nihilism, there appears to be no reason at all to accept deep nihilism. In particular, deep nihilism draws no support either from the usual arguments for nihilism or from considerations of parsimony.
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First archival date: 2013-05-05
Latest version: 2 (2017-09-29)
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Four Dimensionalism.Sider, Theodore

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Composition.Korman, Daniel Z. & Carmichael, Chad
Ordinary Objects.Korman, Daniel Z.

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