Self-evidencing conscious experience and vicious circularity

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The meta-problem of consciousness aims to explain the particularity of our intuitions about consciousness and how they trigger conceptual issues such as the hard problem of consciousness. I propose in this article that these stem from a basic function of the brain : self-evidencing explanation. To make sense of its sensory inputs, the brain is believed to build and test models of the state of the world based on sensory information (Hohwy, 2016). This self-evidencing process has been proposed to describe the type of inference performed by consciousness (Friston, 2018). I will show how this situation is viciously circular and prevents from proving the existence of conscious experience or explaining it without presupposing its existence. I will show how it accounts for the particularity of our intutions about consciousness and thus propose an solution to the meta-problem of consciousness using a formally defined process at the core of conscious inference.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KORSCE
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-04-30
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-04-30

Total views
96 ( #47,778 of 65,755 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #52,209 of 65,755 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.