What Do the Folk Think about Composition and Does it Matter?

In David Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 187-206 (2017)
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Abstract
Rose and Schaffer (forthcoming) argue that teleological thinking has a substantial influence on folk intuitions about composition. They take this to show (i) that we should not rely on folk intuitions about composition and (ii) that we therefore should not reject theories of composition on the basis of intuitions about composition. We cast doubt on the teleological interpretation of folk judgments about composition; we show how their debunking argument can be resisted, even on the assumption that folk intuitions have a teleological source; and we argue that, even if folk intuitions about composition carry no weight, theories of composition can still be rejected on the basis of the intuitions of metaphysicians.
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First archival date: 2015-10-05
Latest version: 3 (2017-02-27)
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References found in this work BETA
Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters?Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Gonnerman, Chad; Buckner, Cameron & Alexander, Joshua
Material Beings.van Inwagen, Peter

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Citations of this work BETA
Composition.Korman, Daniel Z. & Carmichael, Chad
Against Conservatism in Metaphysics.Fairchild, Maegan & Hawthorne, John
Counting Experiments.Livengood, Jonathan
Counting Experiments.Livengood, Jonathan

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