Indywiduum a osoba. Rozważania Boecjusza, Ryszarda ze św. Wiktora i Jana Dunsa Szkota

Filo-Sofija 13 (23):73-88 (2013)
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Abstract
The paper presents John Duns Scotus’ view on the relationship between the notions of person, individual being and incommunicability. Scotus’ opinions on this matter are presented in the context of the approaches taken by Boethius and Richard of St Victor. The main conclusions of the article are as follows. According to Scotus, although individual, the nature of God is communicable. Its individuality is not the effect of a causal relation, however God is an individual being per se. Due to the communicability of God’s nature, each Person of God possesses divinity in full sense. Each God’s Person, as a person, has got two kinds of independence: actual and dispositional, hence one could say that each Person of God is necessarily independent. Individuality of a contingent being is an effect of a process of individuation, in which a neutral nature is contracted into the individual nature by the causal factor, i.e. the haecceitas. Nature as nature is communicable; however, nature which is individual is not communicable due to its individuality. Rational, created, and individual nature is the foundation of the realization of personality. A created person is independent, both in actual and dispositional sense, however, it is not necessarily independent as it has an obediental potentiality to be personified by another personhood. Separated soul (anima separata), in turn, is individual because of its haecceitas, which is the ultimate reality of the form. Because of this kind of individuality, this soul is incommunicable and it has actual independency, although it is not dispositionally independent. Thus, due to its dispositional dependency, the separated soul is not the person.
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