The Two-dimensional Argument Against Physicalism and the Conceptual Analysis

Belgrade Philosophical Annual 24:05-17 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper is divided into three sections. In the first section I briefly outline the background of the problem, i.e. Kripke’s modal argument (Kripke 1980). In the second section I present Chalmers’ account of two- dimensional semantics and two-dimensional argument against physicalism. In the third section I criticize Chalmers’ approach based on two crucial points, one is about necessity of identities and the other is about microphysi- cal descriptions and a priori derivation.

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Daniel Kostić
Leiden University

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