To Leave Open the Possibility for Hardness of the Meta Problem

Abstract

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining subjective experience. This problem is based on the notion that explaining brain functions cannot lead to explaining experience (Chalmers, 1995). The meta problem of consciousness is the problem that why we think there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers suggests that solving the meta problem deals with human reports of the hard problem- named problem reports. He notes that since problem reports are facts of human behavior we can consider them explainable by functional terms. Therefore, the meta problem is an easy problem (Chalmers, 2018). In this article, we are trying to to leave open the possibility for hardness of the meta problem.

Author's Profile

Shahriar Gharibzadeh
Shahid Beheshti University

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