The Deflationary Theory of Ontological Dependence

Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):481-502 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
When an entity ontologically depends on another entity, the former ‘presupposes’ or ‘requires’ the latter in some metaphysical sense. This paper defends a novel view, Dependence Deflationism, according to which ontological dependence is what I call an aggregative cluster concept: a concept which can be understood, but not fully analysed, as a ‘weighted total’ of constructive and modal relations. The view has several benefits: it accounts for clear cases of ontological dependence as well as the source of disagreement in controversial ones; it gives a nice story about the evidential relevance of modal, mereological and set-theoretic facts to ontological dependence; and it makes sense of debates over the relation's formal properties. One important upshot of the deflationary account is that questions of ontological dependence are generally less deep and less interesting than usually thought.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-09-02
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 54 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations.Fogal, Daniel & Risberg, Olle
Ground Grounded.Sider, Theodore

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
277 ( #16,232 of 50,259 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
82 ( #6,269 of 50,259 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.