様相実在論に対するメタ存在論研究に基づく反論

Kagaku Tetsugaku 43 (1):79-90 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Modal realism is an ontological claim according to which there exist many possible worlds just like our actual world. Since it is so hard to believe, modal realism has only a few advocates. However, it is well known that alternative theories have serious problems. It is one of the central issues of metaphysics to find a persuasive way to reject modal realism. In this paper, I will suggest that it could be accomplished with help of metaontology-one of the topics of metaphysics which has recently discussed intensely. I will show how we could argue against modal realism from the metaontological point of view.

Author's Profile

Tora Koyama
Yamaguchi University

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-14

Downloads
287 (#53,861)

6 months
103 (#35,443)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?