Abstract

Interest in “the flesh” (Leib, la chair) in phenomenological research leads to revealing the original (ursprünglich) and non-phenomenal essence of the very appearance. Contemporary phenomenological aesthetics is heading in the same direction. While describing the intentional content of particular, i.e. subjectively “embodied” aesthetic objects, it reveals the ultimate origin (Ursprung) thanks to which the appearance of phenomena is possible at all. At the same time, revealing the ultimate origin — differently named but always meaning the furthest horizon of the possibility of the appearance of phenomena — sometimes claims to be called “first philosophy”. However, such ambitious cognitive aspirations of phenomenological aesthetics may arouse suspicion. This is why, first, we should ask about its differentia specifica and its position among other types of aesthetics, and then consider whether its most significant essential statements are not just as insightful as questionable. I argue for admitting that phenomenological aesthetics has the broadest cognitive horizon and at the same time for limiting its validity for individual actualizations (concretions) of potentiality (potentia) of given phenomena. I also point out that the basic cognitive procedure within phenomenological aesthetics is reductive reasoning, which goes in the opposite direction to logical entailment.