What it might be like to be a group agent

Neuroethics:1-11 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Many theorists have defended the claim that collective entities can attain genuine agential status. If collectives can be agents, this opens up a further question: can they be conscious? That is, is there something that it is like to be them? Eric Schwitzgebel [1] argues that yes, collective entities (including the United States, taken as a whole), may well be significantly conscious. Others, including Kammerer [2], Tononi and Koch [3], and List [4] reject the claim. List does so on the basis of Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of consciousness [5]. I argue here that List’s rejection is too quick, and that groups can, at least in principle, display the kind of informational integration we might think is necessary for consciousness. However, group consciousness will likely differ substantially from the individual experiences that give rise to it. This requires the defender of group consciousness to face up to a similar combination problem as the panpsychist.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KRAWIM
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-02-25
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-02-25

Total views
450 ( #14,490 of 2,454,404 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
290 ( #1,432 of 2,454,404 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.