Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (2):1-15 (2016)
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The notion of intentionality is what Franz Brentano is best known for. But disagreements and misunderstandings still surround his account of its nature. In this paper, I argue that Brentano’s mature account of the nature of intentionality construes it, not as a two-place relation between a subject and an object, nor as a three-place relation between a subject’s act, its object, and a ‘content,’ but as an altogether non-relational, intrinsic property of subjects. I will argue that the view is more defensible than might initially appear

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Uriah Kriegel
Rice University


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