Cognitivism about emotion and the alleged hyperopacity of emotional content

Philosophical Studies 173 (2):315-320 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
According to cognitivism about emotion, emotions are reducible to some non-emotional states. In one version, they are reducible entirely to cognitive states, such as beliefs or judgments; in another, they are reducible to combinations of cognitive and conative states, such as desire or intention. Cognitivism is plausibly regarded as the orthodoxy in the philosophy of emotion since the 1980s. In a recent paper, however, Montague develops a powerful argument against cognitivism. Here I argue that the argument nonetheless fails
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-04-15
Latest version: 2 (2015-04-23)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
1,141 ( #3,893 of 2,448,737 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #22,210 of 2,448,737 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.