Dignāga's Argument for the Awareness Principle: An Analytic Refinement

Philosophy East and West 69:144-156 (2019)
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Contemporary theories of consciousness can be divided along several major fault lines, but one of the most prominent concerns the question of whether they accept the principle that a mental state's being conscious involves essentially its subject being aware of it. Call this the awareness principle: For any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious only if S is aware of M. Although analytic philosophers divide sharply on whether to accept the principle, the philosophy-of-mind literature appears to contain mainly arguments against it, rather than for it. One reason is that those who accept the principle often find themselves in a certain dialectical...
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