Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?

Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307 (2003)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, however, I am quite attachedto a naturalist approach to intentionality. Itwill turn out to be somewhat difficult toreconcile naturalism with the notion thatintentionality is dependent upon consciousness,although, perhaps surprisingly, I will arguethat McGinn's case for such dependence iscompatible with naturalism
Reprint years
2004
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KRIIID
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-12-12
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
A New Puzzle for Phenomenal Intentionality.Peter Clutton & Alexander Sandgren - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Motivation and Horizon: Phenomenal Intentionality in Husserl.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):410-435.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
1,661 ( #784 of 39,579 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
303 ( #1,043 of 39,579 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.