Justifying Desires

Metaphilosophy 44 (3):335-349 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
According to an influential conception of reasons for action, the presence of a desire or some other conative state in the agent is a necessary condition for the agent’s havinga reason for action. This is sometimes known as internalism . In this paper I present a case for the considerably stronger thesis, which I call hyper-internalism , that the presence of a desire is a sufficient condition for the agent’s having a ( prima facie )reason for action
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2014-06-01
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
203 ( #21,691 of 51,433 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #43,184 of 51,433 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.