Two Notions of Mental Representation

In Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. New York, New York: Routledge. pp. 161-179 (2013)
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Abstract

The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.

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Uriah Kriegel
Rice University

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