Why Epistemic Permissions Don’t Agglomerate – Another Reply to Littlejohn

Logos and Episteme 4 (4):451–455 (2013)
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Clayton Littlejohn claims that the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox requires an implausible principle in order to explain why epistemic permissions don't agglomerate. This paper argues that an uncontentious principle suffices to explain this. It also discusses another objection of Littlejohn's, according to which we’re not permitted to believe lottery propositions because we know that we’re not in a position to know them.
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First archival date: 2013-11-21
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