Consciousness is a Private Language: The Semantic Closure Theory of Consciousness

Abstract

The semantic closure theory of consciousness attempts to explain the privacy of conscious representations. Such an explanation requires that representational content is more than just information carried by cognitive states but also arises in virtue of functional interrelations between such states. This paper shows that, given such a fine-grained view of representational content, the privacy or non-communicability of certain mental contents can be readily explained. Furthermore, the degree of semantic closure, i.e. the degree to which the states of a representational system bear non-communicable content, can be quantified in information theoretic terms. A toy simulation of the evolution of semantic closure is presented.

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Peter Kuhn
Goethe University Frankfurt

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2025-03-20

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